Substantialism and phenomenism in Alberto Rougés’ thought

Abstract

The main objective of the present study is to provide some interpretive tools that allow us to delve into the thinking of Alberto Rougés (1880-1945), a philosopher and thinker from Tucumán. Our author had multiple intellectual concerns. Not only did he
practice philosophy systematically, but he was also deeply troubled throughout his life by social, educational, and legal issues. We will emphasize an aspect of his thinking that is often considered only secondarily: his characterization of physical reality through
substantialism and phenomenalist conceptions. We will provide a brief biographical sketch of the author in order to place him in a broader framework that complements our study —referring to Tucumán in the early twentieth century.
Before delving into his ontological thought, we will seek to answer the following question: What is ontology about? We consider this task to be somewhat propaedeutic in order to determine the thinking of an author characterized by his lack of systematicity.
When analyzing phenomenism, we will take into consideration not only some of its most general characteristics but also some authors who represent this position in a paradigmatic way and with whom Rougés extensively discusses (Mach, Duhem, von
Mayer). Regarding substantialism or mechanism, we will seek to highlight the formulations of the uncertainty principle proposed by authors such as Bohr, Heisenberg, and de Broglie throughout the past century. These formulations account for a new mechanism,
similar to the one affirmed by Descartes and Locke, although distinct in some aspects.